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1 Introduction
The work reported here is the result of a study done within a larger project
on the “Semantics of Natural Languages” viewed from the field of Artificial
Intelligence and Computational Linguistics. In this project, we have chosen
a corpus of insurance claim reports.1
These texts deal with a relatively circumscribed domain, that of road traf-
fic, thereby limiting the extra-linguistic knowledge necessary to understand
them. Moreover, these texts present a number of very specific characteris-
tics, insofar as they are written in a quasi-institutional setting which imposes
many constraints on their production.
We first determine what these constraints are in order to then show how
they provide the writer with the means to create as succint a text as possible,
and in a symmetric way, how they provide the reader with the means to
interpret the text and to distinguish between its factual and argumentative
aspects.
1 The Project Inter-PRC Se´mantiques des Langues Naturelles, sponsored by the French
Ministe`re de la Recherche, involves a number of research centers and university laborato-
ries. The texts were provided by the French insurance company MAIF, after being made
anonymous. They have been translated into English by D.E. and the original French texts
are given in the annex.
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2 Characteristics of the texts
This type of texts is culturally well-defined and possesses several characteris-
tics, which both the writer and the reader are perfectly aware of when writing
or reading one of them. It is not a newspaper story, nor a letter to a friend
narrating the car accident, but an insurance claim report which has to follow
several constraints, defined in (1).
(1) Text Parameters
A. the text involves at least two participants, generally two ve-
hicles, one of which is the author’s;
B. the text is obligatorily short, at most one paragraph;
C. by definition, the text is a narration in which an accident
takes place;
D. the text is sent to the author’s insurance company.
Beyond these four parameters which are determined by the nature of the
reports, we also find in this text presuppositions due to the particular domain
involved, the “road” domain. This domain-specific knowledge, which is part
of the more general context C , is called here K . K concerns vehicles, vehicle
motions, traffic rules, the usual behavior of drivers and pedestrians, and also
some elements of “naive” geometry.
Parameter D has a special bearing in so far as the writers know that the
insurance agents must pass a judgement on their behavior and will determine
their share of responsibility in the accident. Necessarily, the authors of those
reports, while supposedly describing in an impartial way the different events
which have occurred, will attempt to lessen their responsability. The texts
thus present many instances of argumentative devices, whose usage forms
part of the more general knowledge of the language conventions, LC . In a
symmetric way, the reader, i.e. the insurance agent, must untangle the factual
description from the argumentative presentation of the events.
We can define the tasks that this type of texts presents for the writer and
for the reader as in (2) and (3) respectively.
(2) The Writer’s Problem: The writer W knows the factual content
P corresponding to the circumstances of the accident and wants
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to convey it through a text T . W must then choose a T such
that (a) it will allow a reader R to rediscover P , and (b) it will
minimize W ’s responsibility.
(3) The Reader’s Problem: The reader R knows the language conven-
tions LC and a part of the context C . R must then determine (a)
the factual content P of the text T and (b) the argumentation
presented by its writer W .
These two symmetrical tasks are thus both composed of a factual and
an argumentative part. These two parts also coincide with the two goals
we can define for an NLP approach to understanding and processing these
texts. At the first level, we try to extract from the text the objective content
corresponding to a factual analysis in order to recreate the event: “What
happened? What real world events concerning the motions of these vehicles
or the scene geometry actually occurred?”
At the second level, we take into account the nature and intent of the
text. Our problem is then to uncover the argumentative devices used by the
writer and to determine how they can be used by the reader, and later by
our system, in interpreting the texts.
Accordingly, the remainder of this paper is divided into two parts. In
section 3, we show the importance of the situational and cultural presuppo-
sitions for parameters A, B and C, and in section 4, we take into account
parameter D, which determines the argumentative aspect of the texts.
3 Factual content of the texts
3.1 Parameter A
Parameter A (the fact that car accidents usually involve two participants,
most often two vehicles) is used to infer the identity of some entities in the
texts, or to establish coreference between two entities.
There is a specific naming convention in French insurance claim reports
for the vehicles involved in an accident: claimants must refer to their own
vehicle as “A” and to their opponent’s as “B”. This convention, although it
is part of the shared knowledge about LC , is not always followed, and indeed
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it seems to be a burden for W . The reason is probably that a stereotypical
description using only labels “A” and “B” for the vehicles involved sounds
very neutral, such as could have been made by any independant observer
of the accident, while in fact W was directly involved in the accident, and
is thus personnally implicated, as a person endowed with awareness and
intentionality. Thus, the authors often do not seem to be able to choose
between a narrative style using the first person (“I”) and a descriptive style
using the third person (“vehicle A”). Most of the texts are not homogeneous
in this respect and combine the two styles, as if there was a struggle, probably
unconscious, between a spontaneous narration of the different events and a
stereotyped description using the convention.
(4) Vehicle A waiting and stopped at the Pont de Levallois lights. Ve-
hicle B arrived and hit my left side mirror with its right side mir-
ror.
This hesitation which we observe in our texts is reinforced by the use
of metonymy. Metonymy is often used to allow the identification of the
container with its content, and a common use of metonymy in our texts
concerns the vehicle and its driver. Metonymy builds a unique discourse
entity, and as a consequence some properties from the vehicle are transferred
to the driver, and vice-versa. Personalization of the vehicles is a typical
example of this transfer: a vehicle becomes endowed with the properties of
a human being, for instance by transferring from the driver to the car the
property of intentionality as in (5 a.), or that of agentivity as in (5 b.).
(5) a. Vehicle B wanted to turn right
b. Being momentarily stopped in the right lane on Boulevard des
Italiens, I had switched my blinker on; I was at a stop and
getting ready to change lanes. Vehicle B coming from my left
squeezed too close to me and damaged the whole left front side.
(T7)
We can see from the example in (6 a.) that this unique entity does not
consist only of the vehicle and its driver, but can also include its passen-
gers. In (6 b.), there is an identification between the vehicle and the writer’s
husband, the writer probably being the insured person.
(6) a. One of the cars in front of me opened its right front door (T3)
b. My husband had entered the intersection when Mr. X’s car hit
the front of the vehicle.
Conversely, transference of properties can be made from the car to the
driver, as in (7 a.) or (7 b.). In (7 a.), objects (here the bumper) belonging to
the vehicle are treated as belonging to the driver. In (7 b.), the property of
“rolling along” (the literal meaning of the verb rouler) is transferred to the
driver.
(7) a. my bumper (T11)
b. Je roulais (I was driving, literally I was rolling)
This use of metonymy follows the coercion of semantic types (see [8]) in
a predictable way: the properties being used to make an entity of one type
(e.g. car : “inanimate mechanical object”) into an entity of another type (e.g.
driver : “human agent”) are extractible in a regular way from the predicate
(e.g. squeeze: “requires an agentive subject”).
This coercion, economical for W because it allows a greater conciseness,
requires additional work on the part of R, because R must make some infer-
ences to undo it and to find the referent of some expression. For instance, a
number of inferences, some of them spatial, are necessary to find the identity
of the agent, i.e. the passenger in the right front seat, in (6 a.).
Finding the exact referent of an expression is necessary in order to block
wrong inferences. For instance, in (5 b.), the 1st person refers successively to
the car and to the driver:
• in I had switched on my blinker , the referent of I is the driver;
• being stopped can be understood with I referring to the driver as well
as to the vehicle;
• in the last sentence, the word me must refer to the vehicle: from this
text, R would never conclude that the driver’s left cheek had been
bruised.
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3.2 Parameter B
When setting to the task of writing such a report, the writer knows parameter
B, the constraint that only about a paragraph may be used to relate the
accident.2 At the same time, W must not forget any important information
whose absence would prevent R from discovering the correct content P .
So, W is thus faced with two goals: to be exhaustive and to be concise.3
These aims are not contradictory but force W to select the information that
will be given: the text T must provide all the information that is necessary
in order to be understood, but only that much. We rediscover here Grice’s
Maxims [5], in particular the Maxim of Quantity, or Ducrot’s exhaustivity
law [2]. Every detail mentioned by W can be assumed to be significant and
every adjective and adverb will carry some significance for the narration, as
in (8), where extremely relevant modifiers are piled up after the head noun.
(8) the road on which the intense traffic is going one-way in two lanes;
(T5)
This constraint on the choice of information to give, which we call “W ’s
selection problem” and which we will later exploit to infer some argumenta-
tive points, is part of the wider language conventions LC and constitutes a
“meta-knowledge”, essential for the success of communication.
Because of “W ’s selection problem”, W will generally mention an event
or an entity only in case its presence cannot be deduced from K or from other
types of shared background knowledge, and only in case an explicit reference
is absolutely necessary to understand the text. From this, it follows that the
number of entities introduced in the text will be kept to a minimum. We can
schematize this “Minimality Assumption” as follows:
(9) Minimality Assumption:
2 There is a predefined area on the printed form for the writer to write this text.
3 Of course, this exhaustivity is not absolute, but is relative to the context for these
texts. There is an “informational norm” in any type of texts and the relevance of the
information to be given is judged relative to this informational norm, which is very difficult
to define precisely and which can only be known empirically (see [7]).
The absence of information is as meaningful as its presence, but is much harder to
assess, since in order to bring it to light, we need a basis for comparison. In this context,
the comparison could be provided by the opponent’s accident report; although difficult to
achieve, this would constitute an interesting study.
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W ’s selection problem + Maxim of Quantity
−− > minimal number of entities introduced
We can see a direct application of the “Minimality Assumption” in (10):
(10) I was driving on the right hand side of the road when a vehicle
arriving in front of me in the curve was completely thrown off
course. Keeping as close as possible to the right, I wasn’t able to
avoid the car which was coming with great speed. (T8)
The text in (10) mentions only two vehicles. The first one,W ’s, is implicit
in I was driving . The other one is mentioned in two different expressions, a
vehicle arriving in front of me in the curve and the car which was coming
with great speed . It is clear that the second expression is anaphoric to the
first, but this coreference is not explicit in the text.
The coreference is allowed first by the use of two compatible terms: indeed
a car is a particular type of vehicle. This fact can be extracted from a
hierarchy of concepts which is part of the background knowledge K (a car
is the most typical kind of vehicle). Secondly, this coreference is licensed
by the use of the definite article, which allows the inference that the entity
has already been mentioned. Finally, it is confirmed by the “Minimality
Assumption”, which prevents the introduction of a third vehicle which would
not play any role in the scene.4
3.3 Parameter C
In many of our texts, the accident is explicitly mentioned with verbs such
as percuter, endommager, toucher, heurter (“collide”, “damage”, “touch”,
“hit”), or with nouns such as choc, collision (“impact”, “collision”). But this
is not the case in (11), a text for which, if it was another type of narrative,
we might imagine other endings to the incident (e.g. but I was able to swerve
and avoid it).
(11) We were in Saint-Ouen, I was surprised by the person who braked
in front of me, not being able to change lanes, and the road being
wet, I couldn’t stop completely in time (T15)
4 See [3] for a more detailed presentation and more examples of this type of inferences
permitted in our texts.
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We can see here the effect of Parameter C: since these texts are accident
reports, the series of events they relate must by default contain an accident.
The interpretation of the texts often requires the reconstruction of an impact
between the two vehicles, otherwise the incident which is described would not
warrant the existence of the report.
The existence of the impact can then be deduced from a combination
of several clues, some linguistic, some inferential. Among the former, we
often find the combination of the negation with a verbal group of the form
“can/be able to + V”, for instance I couldn’t stop completely in time in (11),
or I wasn’t able to avoid the car which was coming with great speed in (10).
4 Argumentation
So far, we have examined the texts from a purely factual point of view.
Now, we take into account the argumentative aspect of these texts. Indeed,
the authors know that these few lines, meant for their insurance company,
may contribute to the final decision about their share of legal and financial
liability. So, they will try to minimize their own responsibility. There are
two ways W can justify his own behavior and make excuses for it:
A. trying to push the blame onto his opponent by accusing him of an
abnormal behavior;
B. contrasting what was expected and what happened in reality, by in-
voking unforeseable circumstances.
With either strategy, W must first show that he has done everything
that was required in the given circumstances and will always try to appear
as innocent as possible.
4.0.1 Strategy A: Blaming the other driver
With strategy A, W wants to suggest or to say explicitly that the other
driver is at fault. Background knowledge K may be used implicitly by W
to suggest that his opponent has misbehaved, and it also allows R to infer
which behaviour is “right” and which one is “wrong”. For instance, in (12),
it is clear, but not explicitly mentioned, that the driver of vehicle B did
something illegal, since in France one must pass on the left.
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(12) The driver of vehicle B passed me on the right. (T11)
In (13), since vehicle B was not respecting the ground markings it made
a mistake in “cutting back in” on W ’s vehicle. Of course, W has taken care
to mention that his own vehicle was in the correct lane.
(13) I was driving in my vehicle A in the right lane reserved for vehi-
cles going straight ahead. Vehicle B was driving in the left lane
reserved for vehicles going left (ground markings with arrows). It
cut back in on my vehicle. (T12)
These two examples show the importance of implicit knowledge, but
blaming the opponent can also be done explicitly. Besides the example in
(14 a.), where the truck driver is clearly said to be responsible for the ma-
noeuver, there are lexical clues, such as slalom in (14 b.) (the driver of (12)
is committing fault after fault!), or blinding in (14 c.), suggesting that the
other driver was at fault. In example (14 d.), even without the background
knowledge of the French right-of-way rules, the words denies and right-of-way
strongly accuse the other driver. Driving at an excessive speed is of course a
very common characteristic of the other driver..., see (14 c.) and (14 e.).
(14) a. the latter turned left, forcing me to steer left to avoid it. (T2)
b. According to the witness who was following me, the driver of
vehicle B was doing a slalom between the cars. (T11)
c. A vehicle with full white headlights blinding us struck us with great speed
in the back of the vehicle, taking us into a series of barrel rolls
before the vehicle stopped in a ditch. (T10)
d. Vehicle B coming from my left, I find myself at the intersec-
tion, at moderate speed, about 40 km/h, when vehicle B hits my
vehicle, and denies me the right-of-way from the right. (T4)
e. at that moment vehicle B passed me with great speed (T9)
4.1 Strategy B: Blaming unforeseable circumstances
Here, the indications are mostly at the lexical level (e.g. eˆtre surpris “to be
surprised”) and make frequent use of the negation.
(15) a. I was surprised by the person who braked in front of me, not being able to
change lanes, and the road being wet (T15)
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b. I didn’t expect that a driver would wish to pass me for there
weren’t two lanes marked on the portion of the road where I
was stopped. (T5)
The use of negation is also a favorite clue to indicate an opposition be-
tween what should have happened and what actually occurred.
(16) a. I wasn’t able to avoid the car which was coming with great
speed. (T8)
b. and the road being wet, I wasn’t able to stop completely in time.
(T15)
Another device is the reverse of the metonymy conflating the vehicle and
its driver which we saw in 3.1. For instance, in (17), it is not W , but the car
which is the subject of the two verbs, as if it was responsible for the events.
(17) on impact, and because of the slippery pavement, my vehicle skids,
and hits the metal railing around a tree, whence a second front
impact. (T4)
Of course the two strategies are not mutually exclusive; (11) and (18) are
actually instances of a mixture of both, in particular (18) where W piles up
all sorts of attenuating circumstances and also emphasizes (immediately put
the brakes on) his own appropriate reactions.
(18) I was driving at about 45 km/h in a small one-way street where
cars were parked on both sides. Popping suddenly on my right
coming out of a private building garage, Mrs.Glorieux’s vehicle
was at a very short distance from my vehicle; passage being impossible:
surprised, I immediately put the brakes on but the impact was un-
avoidable. (T14)
Morover, the authors may choose to describe only that part of reality
which is in their favor, and the reader must thus be able to reconstruct the
items that were left out (intentionally or not).
With strategy B, linguistic clues include the use of reflexive verbs (la porte
s’est ouverte “the door opened”) and of the passive voice (j’ai e´te´ de´porte´ “I
was thrown off course”) instead of a plain active voice. These constructions,
by suppressing the agent, suggest that W was not involved in the course
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of events and cannot be held responsible for what happened. We also find
here all the adverbials and modifiers denoting unexpected events or unusual
states of affairs. In addition to (18), some more examples are given in (19).
(19) a. but I hit the second car which hadn’t yet gone through the stop-
sign. (T1)
b. I wasn’t able to avoid the car which was coming with great speed
(T8)
c. at that moment vehicle B passed me with great speed (T9)
4.2 Resolving Ambiguity and Drawing Inferences
These texts provide a number of examples of clearcut ambiguity between two
situations A and B, which an argumentative type of justification helps resolve.
The question that allows resolving the ambiguity is: “What advantage would
there be for W in implying situation A? or in implying situation B?”. We
go in more details into some examples.
4.2.1 Lexical Ambiguity
As shown in (20), the original French text of the example given in (10)
presents a common kind of ambiguity, since in French, the word droite is
ambiguous between the two interpretations right and straight .5
(20) Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chausse´e (T8)
I was driving on the (right-hand side)/(straight portion) of the
road
Here, even though the whole text can also be interpreted with the droite/straight
meaning, the droite/right interpretation is more plausible. However, only an
argumentative type of reasoning can lead R to prefer the latter.
Since the fact that in France one drives on the right is well-known, in
specifying that he was driving on the right side of the road, W violates the
Maxim of Quantity (i.e. not to say anything superfluous) and therefore must
be taken as intending to convey some other information. In this case, it must
be in order to assert that his behavior was conforming to the “Rules of the
5 If the adjective droite means straight, its opposite is then courbe/curved , if it means
right , the opposite is then gauche/left .
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Road”, which is a pertinent fact to mention. Here, informational redundancy
by itself carries some information which allows inference.
We can thus formulate the following rule:
(21) In case of ambiguity, prefer the interpretation which allows R to
infer a “correct behavior” on W ’s part.
4.2.2 Time Reference Ambiguity
In example (5 b.), repeated here as (22) for convenience, the use of the plu-
perfect had switched on is ambiguous.
(22) Being momentarily stopped in the right lane on Boulevard des Ital-
iens, I had switched my blinker on; I was at a stop and getting
ready to change lanes. Vehicle B coming from my left squeezed
too close to me and damaged the whole left front side. (T7)
The pluperfect implies that the process being talked about is perceived
with another past event as a point of reference, which may not yet have been
mentioned (the situation is exactly parallel in both French and English).
Here, two different referential situations can be envisaged, with two different
consequences:
• If the accident itself is chosen as the point of reference, switching the
blinker on signals a future change of lanes. It must therefore be the
left blinker. This conclusion requires geometrical reasoning: “If X is
stopped in the right lane and if X wants to change lanes, X can only
go left”.
• If the time of stopping is chosen as the point of reference, switching the
blinker on is prior to the time of stopping and thus signals it. It must
then be the right blinker, since the vehicle is in the right lane.
To make a decision, arguments of the “Maxims” type must be used. R
cannot assume that too much information is present in the text. The fact
that the blinker would be switched on before stopping would not be relevant
since the accident occurred after the act of stopping, when W started again.
On the other hand, the fact that W did switch the blinker on before starting
again is very relevant from an argumentative point of view, since the message
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conveyed is then “W behaved in the right way and did what was required”.6
Therefore, by appealing to the rule proposed in (21), the first interpretation
is chosen and R may conclude that W had his left blinker on.
4.2.3 Action or Intention?
Sometimes, the problem for R is to determine whether an action presented
as an intended future event has remained at a purely intentional level or
whether actions have been taken to attain it. For instance, when the intended
action belongs to a script with sequential steps, the question arises whether
some of the preparatory actions belonging to the script have already been
accomplished.
In (22), we saw that there were two possible choices for a point of reference
in the interpretation of the pluperfect. In addition, the verb s’appreˆter a` can
have several interpretations. Like to get ready (which we give here as its
translation), it can mean to be about to and then it is a simple aspectual
auxiliary focussing on the beginning of the action (inchoative). It can also
have a more agentive interpretation and then it means to actively prepare
for .
In the inchoative to be about to interpretation, the action of “switching
the blinker on” is an event independent of “changing lanes”; in the agentive
to prepare for interpretation, that same action corresponds to one of the
preparatory acts. But more crucially, in the agentive interpretation, W may
already have started changing lanes and then probably would be at fault,
while in the inchoative reading, W would still be stopped and would be
innocent.
It seems that in most cases, such an intended future event is more than
simply intentional and that W has indeed already started to act. Otherwise
it would not be possible to explain the accident in (22), since there would
be no reason for W ’s car to have been damaged if W hadn’t already started
turning left.
Similarly in the case of the texts given in (23) and (24) below, the only
plausible reconstruction of the accident requires vehicle “A” to have already
started the action which is presented as an intention (Wanting to pass a
hauler in (23) and I wanted to enter the second lane in (24)).
6 The semantic interpretation of the verb itself can also help in making the choice, see
next section.
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(23) Wanting to pass a hauler with its right blinker on, the latter turned
left, forcing me to steer left to avoid it. The car skidded on the
wet pavement and struck a sidewalk then a fence straight ahead.
The truck driver had indeed switched on his left blinker, but the
trailer was inverting the signal to the right. Not having touched
me, the driver declared himself unconcerned by the situation and
refused to draw a report. Having left my car to call a mechanic,
I came back to find it with the right back door bashed in with no
note left by the guilty party. (T2)
(24) I was stopped at the intersection wishing to take the road on which
the intense traffic is going one-way in two lanes; as the last vehicle
of the flow was coming, I wanted to enter the second lane, leaving
the first one free for it. The moment I started, I heard the shock
in the back; I wasn’t expecting a driver would wish to pass me for
there weren’t two lanes marked on the portion of the road where I
was stopped. (T5)
Instead of using an imperfective verbal form (i.e. e´tant en train de de´passer
un semi-remorque (“while passing a hauler”) in (23), or j’e´tais en train de
tourner a` gauche (“I was turning left”) in (24)) which would clearly indicate
that the action had already started, W chooses the intentional form and in
doing so, creates an ambiguity for R: “Had W actually already done some-
thing or not?”. This lack of precision (or downright lie?) is intentional and
allows W to try to lessen his responsibility, which will succeed if R opts for
a purely intentional reading of the verbal form.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show the importance of situational, cultural and
textual presuppositions from the point of view of both the writer W and the
reader R. As this work constitutes a first step in the study of natural language
semantics in the context of an NLP project, the approach adopted here is an
attempt to automate the process of understanding these texts and deriving
inferences from them. Crucial issues for NLP are how to define and describe
the different types of knowledge involved in the processes of writing and
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reading texts, and how to establish rules that mimic the reasoning involved
in these activities.
Here, we take advantage of the specificity of the texts – the authors nar-
rate events leading to a car accident while trying to lessen their responsability
– to circumscribe the type of knowledge required and to give some rules of
interpretation, valid for this type of text, in this type of context. We have
determined four parameters, and two types of knowledge necessary for both
the production and the interpretation of these reports. Two of these param-
eters (A and C) and K belong to the factual domain, while the other two
parameters (B and D) and LC pertain to discourse.
For clarity of exposition, we have distinguished these two types of char-
acteristics in our texts by examining first the factual content of the texts and
then their argumentative aspect, but it is not always easy to separate them
and we can also ask whether there actually can be a purely factual read-
ing of a text that would not take into account discourse and argumentation
phenomena.
In any case, even if such a reading existed, it would be insufficient to
account for the inferences that the reader can and must make from the textual
data in order to reconstruct the events described by the text and to determine
each participant’s role in it. We have shown for instance that inferences
based on argumentation could often help the reader clarify the text or choose
between several interpretations. We find here the well-known difficulty of
precisely defining the border between semantics and pragmatics.
It would be interesting to analyze the two corresponding texts by the two
opponents reporting the same accident in order to establish which part of
the information is objectively factual and shared by both texts, and which
part of the information is argumentatively biased, thus better distinguishing
the subjective part of both discourses. The omission of information, which
was mentioned as one of the argumentative devices on the part of W and
as a basis for inference on the part of R, would then become an even more
important factor in the analysis. Very few such pairs of texts are available,
but in the continuation of this project, we may try to do some further work
based on these.
Lastly, we have shown that some inferences rely on assessing the relevance
or the quality/quantity of the information given. This assessment itself refers
to a norm which is shared by the community of speakers and thus belongs to
LC. However, it remains extremely difficult to define this norm in advance
15
and this type of inference, though crucial for language understanding, still
appears beyond what is currently possible in NLP.
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Annex: Texts
Text 1
Me rendant a` Beaumont sur Oise depuis Cergy. Je me suis retrouve´e a` un
carrefour juste apre`s la sortie Beaumont sur Oise. J’e´tais a` un stop avec
2 voitures devant moi tournant a` droite vers Mours. Alors que la premie`re
voiture passait ce stop je fis mon controˆle a` gauche et je de´marrais mais je
percutais la deuxie`me voiture qui n’avait pas encore passe´ le stop.
Text 2
Voulant de´passer un semi-remorque qui tournait a` droite, ce dernier tourna
a` gauche m’obligeant a` braquer a` gauche pour l’e´viter. La voiture a de´rape´
sur la chausse´e mouille´e et a percute´ un trottoir puis un mur de cloˆture
en face. Le conducteur du camion avait bien mis son clignotant a` gauche
mais sa remorque inversait le signal sur la droite. Ne m’ayant pas touche´ le
conducteur s’est de´clare´ hors de cause et n’a pas voulu e´tablir de constat.
Ayant quitte´ ma voiture pour appeler un de´panneur j’ai retrouve´ celle-ci avec
la portie`re arrie`re droite enfonce´e sans coordonne´es du responsable.
Text 3
Fort trafic a` 17h15 Bd Se´bastopol. Je roulais entre deux files de voitures
arreˆte´es quand l’une des voitures a` ma gauche a ouvert sa porte avant droite.
Pour l’e´viter, j’ai fait un e´cart qui m’a fait toucher le ve´hicule B avec l’arrie`re
de ma moto ce qui a provoque´ ma chute. Vu l’importance du trafic a` cette
heure la` nous avons juste e´change´ nos assurances et noms ce qui explique que
mon constat amiable ne soit signe´ que par moi.
Text 4
Ve´hicule B venant de ma gauche, je me trouve dans le carrefour, a` faible
vitesse environ 40 km/h, quand le ve´hicule B, percute mon ve´hicule, et me
refuse la priorite´ a` droite. Le premier choc atteint mon aile arrie`re gauche,
sous le choc, et a` cause de la chausse´e glissante, mon ve´hicule de´rape, et
percute la protection me´tallique d’un arbre, d’ou` un second choc frontal.
Text 5
J’e´tais arreˆte´ a` l’intersection de´sirant emprunter la route ou` la circulation
intense s’effectue a` sens unique sur deux voies; lorsque le dernier ve´hicule
du flot arrivait, j’ai voulu m’engager sur la deuxie`me file, lui laissant libre
la premie`re. Au moment ou` je de´marrais, j’ai entendu le choc arrie`re; je ne
m’attendais pas a` ce qu’un usager de´sire me de´passer car il n’y avait pas
deux voies mate´rialise´es sur la portion de route ou` je me trouvais a` l’arreˆt.
Text 6
Mr C.Delon, abordant le carrefour, laissait le passage aux ve´hicules roulant
sur la voie aborde´e, car d’ordinaire se trouve un feu a` ce carrefour. (hors
fonctionnement ce jour-la`). Venant de derrie`re moi, roulant dans le meˆme
sens, dans la meˆme file, Mr Oms n’a pas vu que j’e´tais arreˆte´ et a percute´
fortement mon ve´hicule, l’abimant gravement. De ce fait, j’ai subi (C.Delon)
”le coup du lapin”; le sie`ge conducteur a e´te´ endommage´; les gendarmes se
sont rendus sur place; j’ignore s’ils ont e´tabli un rapport.
Text 7
Etant arreˆte´ momentane´ment sur la file de droite du Boulevard des Italiens
j’avais mis mon clignotant j’e´tais a` l’arreˆt et m’appreˆtant a` changer de file.
Le ve´hicule B arrivant sur ma gauche m’a serre´ de trop pre`s et m’a abime´
tout le coˆte´ avant gauche.
Text 8
Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chausse´e quand un ve´hicule arrivant en face
dans le virage a e´te´ comple`tement de´porte´. Serrant a` droite au maximum, je
n’ai pu e´viter la voiture qui arrivait a` grande vitesse.
Text 9
Nous roulions en ville sur une portion de route a` deux voies ou` la vitesse
est limite´e a` 45km/h. Je clignotais et m’appreˆtais a` tourner a` gauche vers
le chemin de Condos. A ce moment, le ve´hicule B a double´ a` grande vitesse
notre ve´hicule et s’est immobilise´ sur le trottoir gauche de la chausse´e apre`s
m’avoir touche´.
Text 10
Nous roulions sur une route a` 90km/h. Un ve´hicule plein phares blancs
nous aveuglant nous a percute´s a` grande vitesse a` l’arrie`re du ve´hicule, nous
entraˆınant dans une se´rie de tonneaux avant l’immobilisation du ve´hicule
dans un fosse´.
Text 11
Le conducteur du ve´hicule B me doublant par la droite a accroche´ mon pare-
choc avant droit et m’a entraˆıne´ vers le mur amovible du pont de Genevilliers
que j’ai percute´ violemment. D’apre`s les dires du te´moin qui me suivait, le
conducteur du ve´hicule B slalomait entre les voitures. Apre`s m’avoir heurte´,
il a pris la fuite et n’a pu eˆtre rejoint par le te´moin cite´.
Text 12
Je circulais a` bors de mon ve´hicule A sur la file de droite re´serve´e aux
ve´hicules allant tout droit. Le ve´hicule B circulait sur la voie de gauche
re´serve´e aux ve´hicules allant a` gauche (marquage au sol par des fle`ches).
Celui-ci s’est rabattu sur mon ve´hicule A me heurtant a` l’arrie`re gauche.
Text 13
Je roulais dans la rue Pasteur quand une voiture surgit de ma droite; pour
l’e´viter, je me rabattais a` gauche et freinais. Je pus l’e´viter et mon re´troviseur
heurte le sien. La voiture continue car elle n’eut rien et moi, je heurtai une
benne qui stationnait sur le coˆte´ de la chausse´e. La benne n’a pas e´te´ du tout
endommage´e. Ma voiture a e´te´ touche´e a` l’avant ainsi qu’au re´troviseur.
Text 14
Je circulais a` environ 45 km/h dans une petite rue a` sens unique ou` station-
naient des voitures de chaque coˆte´. Surgissant brusquement sur ma droite
sortant d’un parking d’immeuble, le ve´hicule de Mme Glorieux e´tait a` tre`s
peu de distance de mon ve´hicule; le passage e´tant impossible: surpris, je
freinais imme´diatement mais le choc fut ine´vitable.
Text 15
Nous e´tions a` Saint-Ouen, j’ai e´te´ surprise par la personne qui a freine´ devant
moi, n’ayant pas la possibilite´ de changer de voie et la route e´tant mouille´e,
je n’ai pu m’arreˆter comple`tement a` temps.
Text 16
Je m’engageais (ve´hicule A) dans une file de station service. La pompe e´tant
en panne, je reculais pour repartir lorsque j’ai heurte´ le ve´hicule B qui s’e´tait
engage´ e´galement dans la meˆme file pour prendre de l’essence.
Text 17
La conductrice de l’autre ve´hicule et moi amorc¸ions le virage sur la gauche
dans un carrefour. Nous e´tions a` la meˆme hauteur. Nous nous sommes
certainement rapproche´es et par conse´quent percute´es, sa voiture s’emboˆıtant
dans la mienne, son aile gauche dans l’avant late´ral droit de ma voiture.
